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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the relationship between land inequality and 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Therefore, it is developed an occupational choice 
model where an individual decides whether to become a farmer in an already established 
place or to move in search of economic opportunities and land to clear at the agricultural 
frontier. This model provides theoretical predictions that are tested empirically. Based on data 
from 515 municipalities, this paper estimates a Tobit model in order to test the theoretical 
predictions. Basically, it has been shown that there is little statistical evidence to support the 
existence of a direct relationship between land inequality and deforestation. Nevertheless, 
when one takes into account the effects of land inequality on deforestation through its 
interaction with credit and land reform policies, it can be shown that the pattern of land 
distribution, indeed, plays a role for deforestation. There is a positive relationship between 
credit and deforestation in more unequal places. Furthermore, this paper provides evidence 
that land reform in more unequal municipalities reduces deforestation. Hence, it is clear that 
there is a role for government to increase social welfare and reduce deforestation rates. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The loss of large areas of Amazon forest has increasingly become a focus of national and 
international concern. Although this issue has previously been viewed as a threat to the 
overall mega-biodiversity of the planet, it is now assumed that the spreading problems 
associated with climate change will also serve to amplify the dramatic expected losses related 
to the destruction of native forests. After all, deforestation is the primary source of Brazil’s 
contribution to net carbon emissions. Moreover, climate changes can lead to a higher 
frequency of extreme events, such as large floods, droughts or other climatic irregularities, 
and the impact of these events on the soil and water bodies will be accentuated without the 
protection of native vegetation. Events such as the great drought of 2005 and recent floods in 
2009 highlight the vulnerability of the Amazon forest to the extreme events that are expected 
with global warming. Thus, problems associated with deforestation, which are simultaneously 
cause and consequence of climate change, are intensified and consequently garner the 
attention of various governments and of the public at large. 
The literature on deforestation usually focuses on the economic causes of deforestation. On 
the one hand, there are perverse incentives caused by public policies aiming at the 
“development” of the region: fiscal incentives, credit subsidies, infrastructure investments, 
privatization “for free” of extensive public lands, etc. On the other hand, there are economic 
incentives provided by the increasing profitability of activities associated to deforestation 
(unsustainable logging, cattle ranching, cultivation), usually leading to land speculation 
processes that reinforce even further the process of land clearing (for example, Fearnside, 
1992; Schneider, 1994; Ozorio de Almeida and Campari; 1995; Young, 1997; Margulis 2003, 
Angelsen, 1999). 
Although the activity of deforestation is generally highly profitable, it is also associated to big 
risks. As usual in frontier areas, violence occurrence is very common. Disputes over land 
claims often end in death (Sant’Anna and Young, 2010a). This occurs because defining 
property rights is not an easy task in the frontier. Besides risks associated to violent conflicts, 
the mere fact of clearing a plot of land does not guarantee the acquisition of property rights. 
There is, then, a non negligible capital risk in the business. Finally, advancing into a tropical 
forest also provides health risks that arise from diseases like malaria and from the total lack of 
infrastructure like sanitation.  
In this sense, it is not straightforward to assume that the risk-adjusted profitability in the 
frontier is bigger than in another agricultural activity (at least capital or land intensive crops, 
like soybean and sugar cane). In that sense, this paper assumes that the decision to clear land 
must be understood in a broader framework of occupational (or asset composition) choice 
(Takasaki et al., 2000). In sum, the agent always decides whether to become a farmer in an 
already established place or to move to the frontier in search of economic opportunities and 
land to clear (Tole, 2004; Young, 1997). Therefore, it is assumed that deforestation results 
from an economic reasoning that compares payoffs from farming and from clearing land at 
the frontier. As such, the amount of land available for farming is a crucial element of the 
decision.  
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between land inequality and 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Hence, this paper is organized in five sections, 
including this introduction. In section II, a brief revision of the related literature on land 
inequality and deforestation is presented. Section III develops a simple theoretical model that 
highlights how land inequality might affect decisions to clear land and possible policy 
responses and impacts. Based on predictions of the former section, empirical results, based on 
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data from 515 municipalities of Brazilian Amazon, are shown on section IV. Finally, main 
conclusions are presented on section V.  
 
II – RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature on deforestation usually assigns a role for the exclusion to land as a motivation 
for deforestation (Becker, 1991; Fearnside, 1992; Sant’Anna and Young, 2010) Nevertheless, 
in general this process is indicated in a general discussion and it does not deserve a detailed 
observation. Few authors provide empirical analysis regarding the relationship between land 
inequality and deforestation, not many of them related to the Amazon2,3.  
As remarked by Tole (2004), the degree of land accessibility is a function of rural population 
density and land inequality, where unequal systems do worse in accommodating population 
pressures than more egalitarian systems. Thus, the pattern of land distribution shapes 
decisions regarding deforestation.  
Assunção and Ghatak (2003) explain the documented inverse relationship between farm size 
and productivity with heterogeneity in farming skills. According to them, the average farm 
size of skilled farmers is smaller than that of unskilled farmers. Additionally, Assunção 
(2008) shows that unproductive farms are larger than agricultural farms on average. This 
provides a useful insight to understand why land inequality leads to less land accessibility in 
the absence of rental and credit markets.  
In such a framework, an increase in land inequality jointly decreases agricultural production 
and also drives deforestation up. If this is correct, there is clearly much room for policy 
intervention that would increase social welfare. Young and Neves (2009), for instance, 
provide evidence from an analysis of municipalities in Southeast and South Brazilian Mata 
Atlantica that there is no consistent correlation between deforestation and development, as 
measured by the Human Development Index. 
Although Young and Neves (2009) do not propose a causal relation, it can be argued that if 
deforestation decreases development, it is just another form of resource curse, where 
overexploitation of natural resources does not lead to development. Frankel (2010), in a 
survey of the literature on natural resource curse, points to six possible channels for the 
existence of the phenomenon. One of these channels is through poor institutions that arise in 
rent-seeking and extractive states. So, probably, municipalities that have better governance 
schemes will show better results for deforestation and development. 
Poor institutions, as advanced by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), may be an outcome of 
factor endowments. Briefly, according to the authors, factor endowments are central to 
structural inequality (usually associated to land inequality), which is, in turn, a determinant of 
bad institutions, low human capital investment and, therefore, underdevelopment4. Naritomi 
et al. (2009) present evidence that brazilian municipalities that are associated to colonial rent-
                                                          
2
 Tole (2004) analyzes explicitly the relationship between land distribution and deforestation, but in a cross-
country perspective. The author also provides an extensive review of the literature on this subject.  
3
 Caldas et al. (2005), Simmons (2005), Alston et al. (1999) analyze related issues as the role of land reform, 
violence and wealth for deforestation. Nonetheless, the authors do not provide a specific variable related to land 
inequality.  
4
 There is a vast literature that builds on the Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis. See, for instance, Easterly 
(2007) for a revision of the literature and for empirical results that confirm the hypothesis mentioned above. 
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seeking episodes (sugar-cane and gold colonial cycles) display lower provision of public 
goods and lower income per capita5.  
Although this paper focuses only on the relationship between land inequality and 
deforestation, it is arguable that land inequality affects development under different forms, 
including through deforestation. Nonetheless, in this paper, it is explored only the link 
between land inequality and deforestation, as proposed by Tole (2004). 
 
III – A SIMPLE MODEL OF LAND DISTRIBUTION AND DEFORESTATION 
The key characteristic of this model is to address the effect of less land accessibility, through 
an increase in inequality, to deforestation. As remarked before, when someone is about to 
decide whether to move into the frontier to clear land, this possibility is confronted against an 
opportunity cost of farming elsewhere. It is, then, developed an occupational choice model, 
where the individual maximizes her expected utility by choosing what her occupation will be: 
a worker, a farmer or a settler6. The main point is that what matters for an economic analysis 
of deforestation is the relative risk-adjusted payoff. This point is also put forward by Tole 
(2004). 
III.1 Setup 
Consider an economy with infinite periods, overlapping generations and where individuals 
live for two periods. In each period, population with mass normalized to one is born and has a 
given wealth distribution Gt(W). Initial wealth is received as a bequest.  
In period t, individuals decide what to do with their wealth. That is to say, they may buy a plot 
of land L at a price p, they may clear land – D - at the frontier at a cost c, with c<p, or they 
may decide to enter the labor market and receive a wage - w. At the following period, agents 
receive their revenues (wages and profits) and sell their land to the new generation that is 
born, in order to consume. Agents are risk neutral and preferences are given by its 
consumption and the bequest for next generation. 
As shown by Assunção (2008), under such a framework, expected utility can be a function of 
profits and the value of land sold. It is further assumed that there are no credit and land rental 
markets. So, individuals can only go as far as their initial wealth allows. That means that 
cD<W and pL<W.  An important assumption to be made, following Tole (2004), is that 
accessible land is a function of land inequality7.  
If an individual decides to become a farmer, her profit will be revenues received from the sell 
of agricultural products – q – less the wage paid to employee. It is assumed, therefore, a 
production function with fixed technology in labor and land. In this case, there are no capital 
gains after land is sold. If the decision is to clear land, it is assumed that the individual does 
not need to employ labor8 and receives a profit – b. As everyone is price taker in land, there is 
a possibility of capital gains – p-c. This point is crucial, since it is well known that 
deforestation follows a speculative motive that is linked with the “creation of property rights” 
(Sant’Anna & Young, 2010b).  
                                                          
5
 An interesting point made by the authors is that, as the analysis is within Brazil, a country that shares a single 
colonizer, a single language and is highly centralized, they are able to identify different de facto institutional 
arrangements that are associated with different factor endowments. 
6
 As it will be made clear later, initial wealth is crucial for the decision. 
7
 Nonetheless, instead of assuming L = L(i), it will be assumed later that there is a threshold, LF that depends on 
the degree of land inequality.  
8
 Usually, early settlers clear land and establish extensive cattle production that does not require much labor.  
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III.2 – Occupational Choices 
Summing up, individuals can invest in a farm, engage in deforestation or become an 
agricultural worker. Given the structure described above, expected final wealth will be: 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
The occupational choice results from the comparison of the expected final wealth paths in (1). 
At this point, it assumed that there land distribution is not binding on the size of L. Hence, 
individuals will choose to become farmers if final wealth from farming is higher than from 
clearing land and being a worker: 
(2) 
 
Where rL is the return on farming - (q-w)/p – gD is the capital gain from selling deforested 
area – (p-c)/c – and rD is the return on activity after the land is cleared – b/c. Thus, in order to 
become a farmer it is necessary that the return from this activity is larger than that from 
clearing land and initial wealth must be larger than w/rL. 
In order to clear land at the frontier, comparing with becoming a worker, initial wealth must 
be larger than: 
 
(3) 
 
Assuming that there is not yet any constraint on the size of L, we have the following Lemma:  
Lemma 1. If  rL > gD + rD, occupational choices will be restricted to become a farmer or a 
worker, depending on initial wealth. There is no room for deforestation. 
Proof: If rL > gD + rD, it is easy to see that W0<W1. Therefore, if an individual has enough 
wealth for clearing land, she also has wealth for being a farmer at the old frontier.  
Thus, occupational choices are fully described by initial wealth and by the relationship 
between returns from farming and at the frontier. 
III.3 – Introducing land inequality 
Now, suppose accessibility to land is completely related to land inequality9. We will represent 
this by assuming there is a limit on the size of land available to be used – LF(i)<L. Besides, 
when an individual receives her initial wealth, if her option is to keep farming, a portion of 
his/her wealth will be allocated to an asset that does not provide any interest payment – m. 
That is to say: Wt=pLF+m. Thus, occupational choices in that case become: 
 
                                                          
9
 In order to assume this, we follow Assunção (2008), that states that unproductive farms are (weakly) larger 
than agricultural farms on average. If larger farms are kept idle, we assume land inequality is positively related 
to accessibility to land.  
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(4) 
 
 
 
Comparing final expected wealth, the occupational choice pro clearing as compared to 
working and to farming land will occur if: 
 
(5) 
 
It is clear, from (5), that the extend of land inequality, as LF =LF(i), is a major determinant of 
the occupational choice. Again, comparing payoffs between been a farmer and a worker, we 
have the following condition: 
 
(6) 
 
Substituting (6) into farmer’s expected final wealth given by (4), we have: 
 
(7) 
 
Thus W3 is the threshold that determines the minimum wealth level in order to be a farmer. 
As figure 1 depicts, land inequality determines the amount of accessible land. The maximum 
of land that can be used for farming - LF -, in its turn, is determinant of the wealth threshold – 
W2. Above that threshold, the individual will decide to clear land and not to farm.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
As can be seen on Figure 1, if land inequality increases, the wealth threshold W2 moves down 
and, ceteris paribus, there is an increase in deforestation. If the relative return of deforestation 
increases, the slope of the curve will decrease, leading again to an increase in deforestation. 
Next, these main results are presented in a more formal treatment. 
Equilibrium 
An equilibrium in the market for cleared land must equalize the aggregate demand and the 
supply of deforested land. Condition (5) determine that every individual with wealth greater 
than W3 demand W/c units of cleared land. Therefore, the equilibrium condition can be 
arranged as 
(8) 
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Thus, the amount of cleared land under a world with land inequality is given by: 
 
(9) 
 
 
The result above leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Deforestation is positively related to land inequality (i); land prices (p); cattle 
ranching profits (b); and negatively related to cost of deforestation (c); and  agricultural 
prices and yields (q).  As for wages, the effect is ambiguous.  
Proof: The effects on deforestation are driven by the effects on the wealth threshold – W2. A 
higher W2 implies less demand for deforestation. Thus, it is sufficient to analyze the 
determinants of W2. Record that 
  
 
 
It is straightforward that 
  
  
 
On the other hand,  
 
 
 
As wage increases, there will be a point where w>rLpLF. If such a situation occurs, the 
relevant wealth threshold becomes W1. At that point, the effect of wages on deforestation is 
negative. 
From the definition of W2, it is expected that land inequality, land prices and profitability at 
the frontier should exert a positive influence on deforestation. On the other hand, profitability 
of farming and the cost of deforestation should decrease incentives to clearing land. 
Regarding wages, there are mixed signals: since it reduces the incentive to farming it should 
have a positive influence on deforestation, by reducing W2. Nevertheless, wages also 
represent an opportunity cost and as it increases W2, incentives to clearing land are also 
reduced. Thus its influence on deforestation cannot be defined a priori.  
The equilibrium in the labor market is defined by aggregate demand for labor that results 
from farming decisions and supply of labor: 
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The equilibrium wage rate is determined by the endowments of the economy and the wealth 
distribution. 
In the following, we evaluate the role of public policies, more specifically, land reform and 
credit. 
III.4 - Introducing governmental policies 
Land Reform 
Assuming that rL> gD+rD, the emergence of land inequality will result in a loss of welfare, 
irrespective of the decision to engage in deforestation or in becoming a constrained farmer. 
This loss of welfare can be represented by: 
S1= (q-w)(LF-L);                                                                                                               (11) 
S2= (p-c+b)D-(q-w)L-αD; 
In the first case, the loss of welfare is just the difference between the land constrained 
production and the unconstrained one. In the second case, the loss of welfare is the difference 
between private gains from deforestation, the loss of unconstrained production and a 
parameter α that is related to negative externalities related to deforestation as loss of 
biodiversity and CO2 emissions. 
Now suppose two different policies are available for the government. The first one is land 
reform, in order to increase access to land. That is to say, government can act to increase LF, 
at a cost λ(L-LF)10. The second policy, assuming deforestation occurs all in public land, is just 
to “let it go”, making a “fake” land reform. In that case, there is no additional cost for the 
government. Thus, government payoff function is  
 
G = min{(q-w)(L-LF)+ λ(L-LF); (q-w)L-(p-c+b)D+αD}                                                      (12) 
 
Now, assume that W=W2. An individual will be indifferent between clearing land or 
becoming a farmer. In that case, government decision is based exclusively on the analysis of  
λ(L-LF)and αD. If the political cost is larger than the environmental cost, the option is to let 
individuals expand the frontier. Otherwise, government will engage in land reform. Thus, it 
can be expected that where land reform occurs in more unequal places, there will be a 
reduction in deforestation. 
 
Credit 
It is well known that credit subsidies are also an important driver of deforestation. Based on 
that, let us analyze how credit can affect occupational choices. Suppose credit is only directed 
to machines, equipment and fertilizers11. Hence, credit, here represented by δ, affects only q 
and c, with  
 
 
 
 
Thus, an increase in credit availability increases profitability for farming and for clearing 
land. The final effect of credit depends on its relative effects over deforestation and farming. 
That is to say:  
 
                                                          
10
 It can be seen as a political cost the government faces if it is to challenge a powerful landowner elite. Conning 
& Robinson (2007) model the probability of land reform depending on a game between landlords and peasants 
trying to influence political parties. 
11
 It is assumed that credit is earmarked for machines, equipment and fertilizers. Thus, credit constraints still 
hold for the purchase of land. 
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(13) 
 
 
Hence, credit will expand deforestation if 
 
(14) 
 
 
An increase in credit will result in more cleared land if inequality in equation (13) holds. 
Another interpretation for equation (14) is that, given the credit elasticities of q and c, an 
increase in land inequality will result, assuming W=W2, in an increase in deforestation, for the 
same level of credit.  
IV. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
In accordance with the previous section, as inequality reduces access to land, given a low 
opportunity cost12, individuals become more prone to clear land at the frontier. If this 
assumption is correct, deforestation will be a function of previous land inequality in the 
municipality. In addition, the previous section, as it analyzes the role of different policies, 
provides a framework for understanding the effects of land reform on deforestation and of 
credit on deforestation. The literature usually associates land reform and credit availability 
with an increase in deforestation. In accordance with the predictions of the model, land reform 
and credit effects on deforestation might depend on the actual degree of inequality in the 
municipality. These predictions will also be tested in this empirical section. 
III.1. Database 
The data used in this article are from 515 municipalities in eight Amazonian states, namely 
Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins.13 The data 
on deforestation were extracted from the PRODES database, which was provided by the 
National Institute of Space Research (INPE). The pattern of land distribution as measured by 
gini index, was constructed with data from the 1996 Brazilian Agricultural Census. A 
measure of land reform policies was constructed considering the percentage of expropriated 
areas within each municipality from 1998 to 2001. IPEADATA, a database powered by the 
Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA) was the source for these data. The mean value 
of rural credit between 2000 and 2004 was utilized as measure of credit14. These data were 
also extracted from IPEADATA 
Other data were used in the regressions as control variables: an index that measures transport 
cost from the municipality to São Paulo, the population density and the increase in heads of 
cattle per km2 from 2000 to 2007. These data were extracted from the IPEADATA15. 
                                                          
12
 In recent years, the deforestation rate has significantly decreased. This fact may be related to real minimum 
wage gains and, generally, improvements in the labor market conditions in recent years. As such, this is as an 
interesting hypothesis to be explored in later studies.  
13
 Maranhão is also considered part of Legal Amazon, but it was not included in the sample because there was 
incompatibility between data from different sources at the municipal level.  
14
 This is the last year of available information. 
15
 In the appendix, there is a description of the variables and data sources used.  
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The table below presents the principal descriptive statistical values of the data used.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 DEFOR_07_02 LAND_GINI EXPROP DIST_SP DENSITY CRED CATTLE_07_00 
 Mean  2.537  0.799  0.975  3327.544  15.905  4053713.  9.266 
 Median  0.865  0.813  0.000  2922.740  3.182  1237239.  3.446 
 Maximum  23.568  0.940  38.700  10511.92  2127.400  1.14E+08  107.912 
 Minimum  0.000  0.500  0.000  1188.000  0.125  0.000000 -66.994 
 Std. Dev.  3.597  0.066  2.970  1603.701  107.196  10226691  16.933 
 Observations  588  515  588  575  575  588  588 
As indicated above, there was significant heterogeneity in the municipal data. Other than the 
distance to São Paulo and Gini index, the coefficients of variation were all greater than 1. 
For the increase in deforested area between 2002 and 2007, for example, there were 
municipalities with values between zero and almost a quarter of the total area (one 
municipalty). Heterogeneity in data also occurs heavily with expropriation rates and the 
increase in the number of cattle heads. Land inequality on the other hand has a very 
coefficient of variation. This has an implication on the results achieved, as it will be explored 
later on. 
IV.2 The econometric model 
In accordance with the predictions of the theoretical framework presented above, the 
magnitude of land inequality should be able to explain the deforestation rate. Thus, the model 
can be described by the following equation. 
 
(1)  
           
In this equation, Defores02_07 is the deforestation that occurred between 2002 and 2007 in 
relation to the total municipal area, Land_Gini is measure of inequality in land distribution in 
1996, X is a vector of the control variables by municipality, based on the theoretical 
predictions of the previous section and ε is the model error term. It is important to note that 
the period used for the dependent variable is different and later than the period used for the 
independent variable, to address the temporal effect of land inequality on frontier expansion. 
Based on the above description of the land occupation process within the Amazon agricultural 
frontier, it is expected that both the distance to the markets and the livestock activity exert an 
impact on the level of deforestation in the municipalities of the region. In this context, the 
following were used as control variables: the costs of transport from the municipality to São 
Paulo as a proxy for the distance to markets; this same variable squared; the variation in the 
livestock industry between 2000 and 2007; the population density.  
The distance variable appeared in linear and quadratic form to capture the non-linear effects 
discussed in the literature. The goal was to test the U-inverted form proposed by Hotte (2001) 
and Alston et al. (1996). Besides that, distance is used as a proxy for the cost of deforestation 
– c. The variation in the livestock business from 2000 to 2007 captures the effect of the 
incentives (relative to the profitability of the cattle - b) on deforestation, as proposed by 
ε+Xα+giniLandβ+C=Defores i1 01__07_02
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Margulis (2003)16. The population density controls for urban municipalities and is related to 
returns on farming – q – as more dense places should have less productivity.  
Credit and expropriation measures are introduced to capture other effects inferred from the 
model. Later, interaction terms between land inequality, credit and expropriation are 
introduced in order to understand how credit and land reform on more unequal municipalities 
affect deforestation. In that case, the model can be represented by  
 
   
Where Z represents a vector with other variables of interest as credit, expropriation and 
interaction terms between those two variables and land inequality. 
IV.3. Results 
There were a significant number of observations (100 out of 515, or 19.4%) with a zero value 
in the dependent variable. Thus, at first, four regressions were estimated using OLS and Tobit 
methods. These four regressions present results without interaction terms. Table 2 presents the 
results of the model specified above. 
Table 2: First Estimations results 
Dependent variable: 
Deforest_2007_2002 
 
   
  (1) OLS (2) Tobit  (3) OLS (4) Tobit  
C -1.454 -4.491b -3.097 -7.124 a 
  
(1.904) (2.243) (1.913) (2.251) 
LAND_GINI 0.487 1.707 1.011 2.615 
  
(2.144) (2.511) (2.114) (2.461) 
DIST_SP  0.001 a  0.002 a 0.002 a 0.003 a 
  
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DIST_SP^2 
  
-1.37E-07 a 
  
-1.95E-07 a -1.63E-07  -2.36E-07 a 
  
(2.79E-08)  (3.25E-08)  (2.78E-08) (3.25E-08) 
DENSITY  -0.002  -0.039 a -0.001 -0.039 a 
  
 (0.001)  (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
CATTLE_07_00 0.088 a 0.100 a 0.099 a 0.099 a 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
EXPROP   0.135 a 0.175 a 
  
  (0.043) (0.049) 
CRED   5.23E-08 a  7.83E-08 a  
  
  (1.31E-08)  (1.51E-08)  
  
      
OBS 515 515 515 515 
Adj R2 0.21  0.25  
F-Stat 28.989  25.311  
LR chi2  148.98  193.76 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 
a
 significant at the 1% level, b significant at the 5% level, c significant at the 10% level. The values in 
parentheses are the standard errors. In Regressions (1) to (4), 111 of the 588 observations have values equal to 
zero. 
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 In the model presented in section III, this can be translated as a proxy for an increase in b. 
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The first remarking feature of the results is that land inequality cannot significantly be 
associated with deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. In every equation, land inequality 
presents positive coefficients, in accordance with theory, but without statistical significance. 
This might be related to the low variability in the land inequality data that does not allow to 
give significance to the results.  
The amount of credit and expropriated area, as measure of land reform, on the other hand 
present statistical and economic significance. Both have positive coefficients. These results 
are in line with many authors’ findings and signal that there are strong economic incentives 
for deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon region. (Alston et. al, 1999; Silva, 2010, Roebeling 
and Hendrix, 2010). In fact, as observed in Section II, deforestation confers to the occupant 
greater capitalization (because deforested land is more valued) and provides benefits through 
the sale of wood and the development of cattle activities.17 
Control variables present expected signs and are statistically significant for the whole range of 
equations. Moreover, coefficients are highly stable. Distance to markets corresponds to the 
behavior predicted by the theory; the positive and negative coefficients for the linear and 
quadratic variables respectively provide evidence that the thesis that distance to markets 
affects the deforestation in the form of a U-inverted curve. The observed result corroborates 
the hypothesis that there are two factors that link deforestation to the distance from markets. 
On one hand, land close to markets tends to enjoy a better definition of property rights. This 
factor creates an incentive for frontier expansion into more distant regions. On the other hand, 
the transport costs grow with distance. It is the interaction between these two factors that 
causes the effect of distance on deforestation. Thus, one can understand the relationship 
between deforestation and distance from markets using a Ricardian land model by introducing 
a restriction that is associated with an increased cost of transport.18  
The variable that measures the increase in the livestock industry from 2000 to 2007, 
CATTLE07_00, presents positive coefficients in all specifications. This result corroborates 
the theory of Margulis (2003) that livestock is a major cause of deforestation in the region. 
Population density shows a negative sign, which might be related to urban areas, where 
pressure over deforestation is no longer a big issue. 
Effects of land inequality, credit and land reform 
Although the results related to land inequality do not show statistical significance, it is 
interesting to analyze what happens when interaction terms are introduced (Table 3).  
Still, there is little evidence that land inequality is directly related to deforestation. There are, 
indeed, signal changes depending on the regressions’ specifications. Thus, a first conclusion 
is that there is no evidence of a positive relationship between land inequality and 
deforestation.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 For a description of this process, see Castro (2005). 
18
 It should be noted that the opening of highways relaxes this restriction and consequently permits the expansion 
of the deforestation frontier.  
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Table 3: Estimations results with interaction terms 
Dependent variable: 
Deforest_2007_2002 
 
     
  (5) OLS (6) Tobit  (6) OLS  (7) Tobit  (8) OLS  (9) Tobit 
C -4.589 b -8.526 a -1.922 -5.307 a -3.409 c -6.733 a 
  
(1.959) (2.308) (1.957) (2.285) (1.995) (2.335) 
LAND_GINI 2.800 4.289c -0.759 -0.135 1.010 1.556 
  
(2.176) (2.534) (2.212) (2.561) (2.262) (2.621) 
EXPROP 2.050 a 1.948 a 0.139 a 0.182 a 2.111a 2.023 a 
  
(0.625) (0.711) (0.043) (0.049) (0.622) (0.704) 
CRED 5.07E-08 a  7.68E-08 a  -2.95E-07 b  -4.51E-07 a -3.11E-07 b -4.62E-07 a 
  
(1.30E-08)  (1.50E-08)  (1.36E-07)  (1.53E-07)  (1.35E-07)  (1.52E-07)  
DIST_SP  0.002 a 0.003 a 0.002 a 0.003 a 0.002 a 0.003 a 
  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DIST_SP^2 
  
-1.60E-07 a -2.33E-07 a -1.69E-07 a -2.47E-07 a -1.67E-07 a -2.45E-07 a 
  
(2.76E-08)  (3.23E-08) (2.78E-08) (3.24E-08) (2.76E-08) (3.22E-08) 
DENSITY  -0.001 -0.037 a -0.002  -0.042 a -0.001  -0.039 a 
  
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
CATTLE_07_00 0.087 a 0.099 a 0.087 a 0.100 a 0.087 a 0.100 a 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
EXPROP*LAND_GINI -2.311 a -2.141 b   -2.379 a -2.223 b 
 
(0.753) (0.856)  
 
(0.749) (0.847) 
CRED*LAND_GINI    4.60E-07 b  7.01E-07 a 4.79E-07 a 7.13E-07 a 
  
   (1.79E-07)   (2.03E-07)  (1.78E-07)  (2.01E-07)  
  
          
OBS 515 515 515 515 515 515 
Adj R2 0.26  0.26  0.27  
F-Stat 23.692  23.219  22.133  
LR chi2  193.76  199.46  206.29 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
a
 significant at the 1% level, b significant at the 5% level, c significant at the 10% level. The values in 
parentheses are the standard errors. In Regressions (1) to (4), 111 of the 588 observations have values equal to 
zero. 
The interaction between inequality and land reform implies a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient. This means that when government expropriates land in more unequal 
municipalities, there is, actually, a decrease in deforestation. This result corroborates the 
model: if land reform is targeted to more unequal areas, deforestation shall be reduced. The 
overall effect of land reform is not different from zero as the coefficient of expropriation 
alone counteracts the interaction term. Thus, it can be said that, as it is designed today, land 
reform exerts little influence on deforestation.    
Equations (6) and (7) that account for the interaction between credit and land inequality are 
also in accordance with theory. The availability of credit in more unequal regions increases 
deforestation. This is so because credit availability increases profitability from clearing land 
more than profitability from agricultural production, as land inequality reduces access to land 
for farming. Even accounting for credit individually, its overall influence is still positive. 
Probably, credit-elasticity for deforestation is larger than the credit-elasticity for farming.  
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These two results are striking as they show that, although land inequality does not influence 
deforestation directly, it can still have important effects as it affects the results of important 
policies like land reform and rural credit. 
 
Endogeneity problems 
It should be noted that there is a potential for endogeneity between deforestation and land 
inequality in the estimation. If deforestation is part of the process of occupying land that 
ultimately reproduces the current pattern of land distribution, it may occur an endogeneity 
problem.  
In order to address this problem, we used the land inequality variable as of 1996 and 
deforestation data is from 2002 to 2007. Moreover, if the endogeneity above discussed were 
to exist, there should exist a strong correlation between the stock of deforestation (measured 
by total deforested area in 2001) and land inequality. Nonetheless, the correlation between 
land inequality in 1996 and total deforested area in 2001 is only 0.06 and is not robust19.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This work aimed to address the impacts of land inequality on deforestation. Hence, it was 
presented a theoretical model that links the pattern of land distribution to individual decisions 
to clear land at the frontier. The empirical results, nonetheless, did not confirm the theoretical 
hypothesis. This might have happened because the model works with comparative statics and 
what actually happens is somewhat different. Thus, the parameters of the model could have 
changed evolving the model in a new dynamic. Some of the control variables were utilized in 
order to account for these parameter changes. Distance to markets, for instance, affects both 
land prices, costs of deforestation and agricultural returns. The increase in livestock measures 
the profitability in cleared land.  
An additional feature of the model is to identify the impacts on deforestation of a credit 
expansion and land reform. Here lie the main results of this paper: usually, the literature 
imputes a positive relationship between land reform (and credit expansion) and deforestation. 
This paper suggests that this relationship must take in account the actual pattern of land 
distribution in the municipality. Thus, when one takes in account this relationship by 
introducing interaction terms, results become much more interesting.  
When land reform occurs in more unequal places, there is a negative relationship between 
expropriated areas and deforestation. This means that if government chooses the correct 
municipalities to introduce land reforms there is a potential for substantial welfare gains. 
Moreover, as Assunção (2008) remarks on average unproductive farms are larger than 
productive farms. Thus, a reduction in land inequality can boost agricultural production 
without implying an increase in deforestation. 
Regarding credit policies, there are a significant number of papers that link credit subsidies 
with deforestation. In this paper, it is argued that this relationship depends on credit elasticity 
of farming and credit elasticity of deforestation and also on the level of land inequality. 
Indeed, Assunção et al (2012) show that the rural credit policy change introduced in 2008 
actually led to a reduction in deforestation, especially related to a decrease in livestock loans 
                                                          
19
 2001 is the first year for the dataset on total deforested area. 
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and through large and medium contracts rather than small loans. The empirical analysis has 
shown that credit has, indeed, a positive coefficient on deforestation. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of the interaction term between credit and land inequality shows that this result 
exists through this relationship. In other words, where there is more land inequality, credit 
expansion leads to higher deforestation rates. 
This paper has some results that can provide interesting references for governmental policies 
as regarding the relationship between land distribution and deforestation. When one takes into 
account the effects of land distribution on occupational choices and how they relate to credit 
and land reform, it is clear that there is substantial role for welfare improvements that can lead 
us to situation with less deforestation and better land use.  
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Appendix 1 – Description of Variables and Correlation Matrix 
Variable Definition Source 
Deforest_2007_2002 Deforested area from 2007 to 2002 
as a percentage of total municipality 
area 
 
National Institute of Space 
Research - INPE 
 
Gini_Land Land inequality as measured by the 
gini index based on information of 
1996 brazilian census 
 
Naritomi et al (2009). 
Dist_sp Indexed cost of transportation from 
the municipal headquarters to São 
Paulo city 
IPEADATA 
 
Exprop expropriated areas within the IPEADATA 
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municipality from 1998 to 2001 as a 
percentage of total municipality area 
 
 
Cattle07_00 Increase in heads of cattle per km2 
from 2007 to 2000 
 
IBGE 
Density Population density: inhabitants per 
km2 
IPEADATA 
Cred Rural credit: average value from 
2000 to 2004 
IPEADATA 
 
  
 
Correlation Matrix 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Date: 01/31/11   Time: 11:47      
Sample (adjusted): 1 588      
Included observations: 515 after adjustments     
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)    
        
        Correlation       
Probability DEFOR_07_02 GINI_LAND EXPROP DIST_SP DENSITY CRED CATTLE_07_00 
DEFOR_07_02 1.000000       
 -----        
        
GINI_LAND -0.015779 1.000000      
 0.7209 -----       
        
EXPROP 0.197587 0.075147 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0884 -----      
        
DIST_SP  -0.059194 -0.277208 -0.126922 1.000000    
 0.1798 0.0000 0.0039 -----     
        
DENSITY -0.061616 -0.015072 -0.015207 -0.020311 1.000000   
 0.1626 0.7329 0.7306 0.6456 -----    
        
CRED  0.073544 -0.039563 0.004981 -0.204996 -0.018943 1.000000  
 0.0955 0.3703 0.9102 0.0000 0.6680 -----   
        
CATTLE_07_00 0.427004 -0.072809 0.202705 -0.131923 -0.041002 -0.075440 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0988 0.0000 0.0027 0.3531 0.0872 -----  
        
        
 
 
 
